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Abstract
This paper provides a theory of the interactions between knowledge codication, rm-level or-
ganization structures, information di¤usion and the dynamics of technological competition. At the
rm level, we focus on incentives to design Knowledge Management policies based on the codi-
cation of soft into hard information. At the aggregate level, we discuss the endogenous nature of
knowledge spillover and the implications for macroeconomic growth. The model predicts the exis-
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Evidence from research conducted since the mid-1960s shows that [...] managers get two thirds
of their information to make decisions from face-to-face or telephone conversations; they acquire the
remaining third from documents, most of which come from outside the organization, (Davenport,
1994, Harvard Business Review).
1 Introduction
Nowadays, Knowledge Management is receiving tremendous attention within companies and among
business academics.1 A landmark study by OECD (2003) nds that Knowledge Management (KM)
practices are by now a widespread phenomenon across countries, concentrated not only in high
tech/knowledge-intensive industries but also in more traditional manufacturing industries. On the
academic front, business gurus keep on stressing the importance of KM as a necessary tool to achieve
competitiveness in the so-called "Knowledge-based Economy"2. Surprisingly, economists have so far
paid little attention to this recent phenomenon.
Conceptually, KM is about "a range of practices used in an organisation to identify, create, rep-
resent, distribute and enable adoption of insights and experiences. Such insights and experiences
comprise knowledge, either embodied in individuals or embedded in organisational processes or prac-
tice" (Wikipedia). Given the importance that information ows and knowledge have for innovation,
market success and socioeconomic relationships, KM therefore leads naturally to a number of inter-
esting and important economic questions. How should a rm manage the nature and di¤usion of its
informational ows in a given competitive environment? Should it codify its processes or should it
rely on the existence of tacit knowledge? What are the macroeconomic implications for the dynamics
of innovation and economic growth? In this paper, we provide a rst theoretical attempt to discuss
and understand these issues.
We emphasize the basic transformation of soft information into hard information. Typically, this
transformation takes place through a codication process that systematically increases the transfer
capacity of information across individuals. We identify a crucial trade-o¤: Codication of information
enables veriability by a third party and therefore allows the design of more explicit and e¢ cient
contracts within a given group of contracting agents; for the very same reason however, codication
leads to increased possibilities of informational spillover to other third parties who might exploit
these spillover to out-compete the initial contracting group. In this paper, we consider this trade-o¤
within the context of innovating rms where contracting and transfer of information is important for
e¢ cient production. We investigate the aggregate consequences of this rm-level trade-o¤ in term
of organizational structures, dynamics of technological competition and macroeconomic growth. For
1 In the business literature, there are at least 30 periodicals and magazines publishing articles, case studies
and analyses on Knowledge Management (a good reference is the Knowledge Management Resource Center at
http://www.kmresource.com).
2See for instance Peter Drucker (1999) or Thomas Davenport who claims that "Knowledge management has to be
baked into the job. Its got to be part of the fabric of the work." (http://www.cio.com/archive/110199/think.html).
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this purpose, a standard Schumpeterian growth model with quality ladder a la Aghion and Howitt
(1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) is coupled to a model of internal organization of the rm
characterized by an endogenous dimension of contract incompleteness.
We consider a theoretical framework where success in R&D competition depends crucially on
informational spillover. At each date creative-destruction happens in the sense that R&D may result
in the discovery by an Entrepreneur of a new leading-edge technology which forces the incumbent rm
to exit the market. At each date, production by the successful Entrepreneur is a two stage process:
there is a "quality" stage where a set of strategic actions must be undertaken by an Agent hired by
the Entrepreneur in order to adapt the leading-edge technology to an exogenously changing market
environment; then there is a "quantity" stage where workers are hired to produce with the technology.
During the quality stage, the Entrepreneur must transmit to the Agent some information about the
set of correct strategic actions. Actions being costly to the Agent, there is room for moral-hazard and
hold-up: indeed we assume that due to imperfect veriability by a third party the Agent can always
choose a wrong action at a lower cost. This moral hazard problem can be solved by the Entrepreneur
through two di¤erent margins: the KM policy and the organizational structure.
We consider two types of information transmission policies (ie. KM policies). The Entrepreneur
can have a "face-to-face" interaction with the Agent where information on actions remains soft and
there is only transmission of the bit of information relevant for the current period. Alternatively,
the Entrepreneur can undertake codication where the Agent receives a blueprint (or plan of actions)
specifying the set of relevant actions. In this way, soft information is transformed into hard information.
Codication allows the writing of formal contracts that solve the moral-hazard problem. At the same
time though, codication has a cost in term of informational spillover as we assume that the share of
hard information is immediately available to other R&D competitors who may use it to leapfrog the
leading edge rm. Hence, in spite of the moral hazard problem, the entrepreneur may still choose to
keep information soft in order to reduce competitive pressures. The Entrepreneur can mix the two
policies by codifying only a share of the actions while the residual share of information remains soft
and is transmitted through face-to-face interaction.
We consider two di¤erent organizational structures. The rst one corresponds to "in-house" re-
lational labor contracts involving a repeated relationship between the Entrepreneur and the Agent.
In such a situation, the moral-hazard problem is solved through the delivery of an ex-post informal
bonus that is paid if the Agent has undertaken the set of correct actions. The second one corresponds
to joint-ownership of production by the Entrepreneur and the Agent. The Agent internalizes now the
surplus enhancing e¤ect of choosing the correct actions and this therefore solves the moral hazard
problem.
We analyze how the optimal KM policy of rms (ie. the share of soft information) interacts with
their optimal organizational structure (in-house versus joint-ownership) and their competitive environ-
ment. Our rst partial-equilibrium result is that joint-ownership is compatible with more informational
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softness than in-house production. The reason is that under in-house relational contracts and large
informational softness, the moral-hazard problem is so severe than the Entrepreneur may be tempted
to renege ex-post on the (large) bonus. To the contrary, joint-ownership is an ex-ante commitment
and can thus credibly sustain larger informational softness. As a consequence joint-ownership limits
codication and informational spillover toward competitors. This makes joint-ownership optimal when
technological competition is intense. By contrast, in-house production with codication is preferred by
the Entrepreneur when intensity of technological competition is low. In that case information spillover
are not too harmful, codication dampens the moral hazard problem and this reduces the share of the
surplus that the Entrepreneur must transfer to the Agent.
Closing the model in general equilibrium allows us to derive implications at the macroeconomic
level. We provide two interesting comparative statics. First, we highlight the existence of a Bell-shaped
e¤ect of technological competition on codication. We believe this result to be roughly consistent with
some patterns of long run development of various developed economies: the switch from craftsmanship
to mass-production and then to the "knowledge-based" economy (see Mokyr, 2002, for a discussion).
In particular, our analysis suggests that the increased di¤usion of Information Technologies may
paradoxically induce an increased reliance on soft information and tacit knowledge; this being also
associated with major shifts in terms of work organizational structures at the corporate level. This
view is consistent with some stylized facts uncovered by Autor, Murnane and Levy (2003).
Second, our theoretical analysis relates to the nature of scale e¤ects involved in the growth process,
namely the fact that growth rates are positively related to the stock of resources available for innovation
and R&D. The debate in the growth literature focuses on the strength of those scale e¤ects: While
evidence based on historical trends in the very long run is compatible with the existence of strong
scale e¤ects, empirical studies of growth patterns based on post WWII evidence suggest that scale
e¤ects are in fact quite weak (see Jones, 2005, for a discussion). By endogenizing information ows
(soft versus hard) and the associated structure of spillover in the economy, our approach provides an
explanation for the changing nature of scale e¤ects during the growth process.
The paper is then organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and how we con-
tribute to it. Section 3 then describes some stylized facts from the Knowledge Management literature
that our model will incorporate. Section 4 presents formally the model. In Section 5, the model is
solved and the main results are discussed. Our comparative statics are then performed in section 6.
Finally, section 7 concludes. Proofs and formal assumptions are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. In our framework, the degree of contractual
incompleteness is endogenous. This is related to Battigalli and Maggi (2002) who argue that the limit
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to contractual completeness comes from the direct cost of writing contracts. Here we rather empha-
size the importance of information spillover and outside competition in a¤ecting incompleteness. Our
model endogenizes the mix between formal aspects of organization (understood as job description,
formal contracts, etc.) and the informal aspects (as relational contracts, reputation, and non contrac-
tual dimensions, etc.). This mix is a crucial feature of organizations; it has long been emphasized by
the sociological literature and more recently addressed by the economic literature (see Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy 2002). Our paper contributes to this line of research by highlighting that this mix is
endogenous and shaped by the policy of knowledge codication at the rm level.
This paper also contributes to a recent emerging literature analyzing the links between the internal
organization of the rm and macroeconomic growth. Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) for instance con-
sider a model in which rms implement production projects through two alternative organizational
structures. They can choose between a "mechanistic" organization that provides high productivity
at the expense of a sunk cost and an "organistic" organization that provides low productivity with-
out sunk costs. Larger growth through creative destruction reduces the expected lifetime of projects
and therefore reduces the rms incentives to adopt the "mechanistic" organizations. In this way,
the macroeconomic environment impinges on the organizational choices of rms. On the other hand,
rmsorganizational choices feed back into the growth rate of the economy as changes in organizational
structures a¤ect the rmsprotability and research activity.
Martimort and Verdier (2004) investigate the possibility of internal self-enforcing collusive agree-
ments between workers within the rm and how it interacts with the macroeconomy. Typically, long
lived projects and their associated repeated interactions allow managers to sustain collusive outcomes
which bring ine¢ ciencies at the rm level. Larger innovation rates increase the turnover of projects
and undermine this capacity of self enforced collusion. This in turn increases the internal e¢ ciency of
the rms and stimulates further incentives for research and innovations.
Closest to our work, François and Roberts (2003) analyze the contracting problem between the
owner of an innovation (the rm) and a manager that is supposed to implement the project. In an
incomplete contracting setting, they also emphasize two types of self enforcing contracts that can
solve the hold-up problem between the innovator and the manager. In the rst case ("the contractor"
case), the moral hazard problem resides in the manager that needs to provide the right e¤ort after the
innovator committed payments. In the other case ("the internal labor market"), the rm is subject
to moral hazard in the payment after the manager already provided his e¤ort. Growth and turnover
makes it harder for the rm to sustain the "internal labor market" self enforcing solution. This shifts
the optimal organizational structure towards the "contractor" solution, moving the division of the
surplus in favor of the manager. This in turn a¤ects negatively the incentives for innovation and
macroeconomic growth.
A distinctive element of our work is the idea that rms can control the degree of information
softness present in their organizational structure. This feature has two consequences. First, with
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knowledge codication, a rm can increase the level of explicit contracting with its workers within
its organization. Second, the resulting degree of information softness a¤ects the level of knowledge
external spillover that competitors enjoy, impacting therefore the competitive pressures that this rm
will face. The nature of endogenous knowledge spillover generates then a feedback e¤ect from the
microstructure of the rm to macroeconomic growth.
Beyond internal relational labor contracts, we also allow rms to have the possibility to have
joint ownership with the manager and to rely on ex-post bilateral bargaining. As in Francois and
Roberts (2003), when growth increases, this strategy becomes more likely. The mechanism through
which this occurs however is di¤erent. In Francois and Roberts (2003), as growth increases, faster
turnover makes it harder for the rm to sustain an "internal labor market" self enforcing solution.
At some point, rms cannot credibly commit to paying employees in the future for e¤ort exerted
today and the only possibility then is to shift to the "contractor" solution and leave to the manager
an ex-ante "e¢ ciency" wage. In the present paper, ownership leaves ex-post rents to the manager
and solves his moral hazard problem irrespective of the degree of information softness. Given this,
the rm is able to implement a full degree of internal information softness. This in turn reduces
knowledge spillover and the probability to be leapfrogged by a competitor, increasing thereby the
expected lifetime of the rm. This option is all the more valuable the larger the growth rate of the
economy. Hence, in addition to a¤ect the division of the surplus between the rm and the manager,
a change of organizational structure in our model also a¤ects the nature of informational ows in the
economy, providing therefore a further channel of impact on the incentives for innovation and thereby
macroeconomic growth.
Finally, at a more general level, a signicant amount of work emphasizes the importance of tech-
nological spillover in models of endogenous growth, development, international trade and economic
geography. It is well known that results emanating from these models are drastically a¤ected by
the specication of spillover (local vs global). While aware that the size and scope of spillover are
linked to the existence of soft information (see Krugman 1991) most of these theories take the nature
of spillover as exogenously given. Our model is a rst step towards endogenizing this aspects by
providing micro-foundations of some information transmission processes.
3 Stylized Facts on knowledge management
Before getting into the formal analysis, we outline in this section some stylized facts from the Knowl-
edge Management and related Business literature that we think are relevant for our theoretical frame-
work.
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3.1 The tacit component of Knowledge
The standard approach in the economics of information is to consider knowledge as sharing public
good characteristics such as non rivalry and costless transferability (see Arrow 1962). Still, there is
a well established tradition among practitioners of the rm insisting on the fact that knowledge is
partially tacit and only partially transferable (Davenport, Konoka, Von Hippel 1994, Nickerson and
Zender 2002). In the economic literature, Polanyi (1958) is the rst to establish the existence of a
component of knowledge which is essentially tacit, contextual and not easily expressible to someone
else. Nelson and Winter (1982) also emphasizes the importance of knowledge tacitness and information
softness in skill-intensive activities.
The concept of tacit knowledge has also been popularized by the school of Sociology of Scientic
Knowledge. Studies by Collins (1974) for the case of the construction of the TEA laser or by McKenzie
and Spinardi (1995) for the design and construction of nuclear weapons in the US during WWII,
both emphasize the idea that some kind of knowledge deployed in scientic inquiry (ie. reading and
interpreting the data, design of experimental instruments,...) is not transmitted among researchers
through explicit and codied statements.
3.2 KM policies are a mix between face-to-face interactions and codied proce-
dures
One important dimension of KM policies emphasized by the literature (Hansen, Norhia and Tierney
1999; Quintas 2003) is the fact that KM policies are basically a mix between two types of practices
commonly used by rms: so called personalizationwhere knowledge remains in its tacit form and is
shared through face-to-face interaction and codication where information is hard, proceduralized
and available to anyone in the company. Quoting Foray and Gault (2003):  [In] Personnalization,
knowledge remains in its tacit form and is closely bound to the person who developed it; it is shared
primarily through person-to-person contact. To make this strategy work, companies invest heavily
in networks of person (mobility, culture of bilateral interaction)...". On the other hand codication
involves the setup of written documents and regularly updated databases where training manuals, good
work practices and more generally so-called organizational memoryare stored. As such, codication
is more e¢ cient when supported by the intensive use of ICT.
3.3 Codication of knowledge is a strategic choice variable
Case studies support the view that codication of knowledge is not only driven by technological feasi-
bility but results also from a strategic choice at the rm level. Hansen et al., (1999) report di¤erences
of KM strategies within the consulting industry: Ernst & Young and Andersen Consulting have devel-
oped rm-wide IT systems for document sharing and best practices codication while, on the contrary,
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McKinsey consultants and Bain&Company rely on networking, face-to-face interactions and an infor-
mal culture of experts. Baumard (1999) discusses how, the Australian airline Qantas tried to introduce
a new computer-based policy favoring documents, manuals and computerized information and faced
opposition of pilots preferring non formal circulation of knowledge. The OECD (2003) systematic
survey on KM practices across various countries reports that most rms undertaking KM strategies
and codication procedures, do this with the specic goal of information sharing and information
capturing and that, even within an industry (ie. for the same types of products) the KM strategy
may vary according to the external business strategy that the rm seeks to develop.
3.4 Information softness reduces technological spillover across rms
The innovation literature recognizes the importance of the distinction between tacit and codied
knowledge in understanding the role of technological spillover (Kogut and Zander 1996, Teece 2005,
Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehman, 2006). More specically, the idea that information softness tends to
reduce external technological spillover is consistent with evidence gathered in the empirical literature
on technology spillover and di¤usion. An important stylized fact from that literature is the fact that
knowledge spillover are spatially localized and that the scope of this spatial e¤ect is negatively linked to
the existence of soft information (Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Keller 2002, Feldman and Lichtenberg
1997). Indeed as pointed by Ja¤re (2002) geographical location is important in capturing the benets
of spillover only to the extent that the transfer of information is obtained through informal and
localized interactions, as is typically the case for soft information and tacit knowledge items.
Conversely, codied knowledge is more likely to lead to cross-rm informational leakages. An in-
teresting example of this is related to the case of "industrial espionage". Simm and Ferdinand (2006)
discuss various case studies suggesting that informational leakages of that sort are greatly facilitated
by the existence of encoded procedures and information blueprints. They report in particular the case
of a bidding competition between Boeing and Lookheed worth 2$ billion contract for a US Air Force
contract for rocket-launchers in 1988. In order to get access to condential information on its competi-
tor, Boeing hired a former employee from Lookheed who brought with him proprietary documents of
about 8,800 pages revealing secret information on Lookheed procedures. In a subsequent investigation,
the US Air Force also found that Boeing had acquired other 25,000 Lockheed documents suggesting
that the initial case was not an isolated incident and that information transfer from Lookheed to Boe-
ing had been facilitated by Lookheeds codication of knowledge into these documents and blueprints
(Swartz 2003).
Interestingly, the development of Information Technologies (IT) has also been reported to promote
the potential for informational leakage of codied knowledge. The Computer and Security literature
emphasizes how the Internet and associated technologies have already revolutionized the collection
and analysis of competitive information. Open source information provides a wealth of knowledge
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for industrial competitors because those sources take a variety of forms including newspaper articles,
corporate Annual Reports, patent lings, court papers, and marketing information. By reviewing
these legal open sources, competitors can determine a signicant amount of information about a
company and their products. From a non legal point of view, Boni and Kovacich (2000) in their
book on "Netspionage", discuss how the enhanced use of IT and communication networking tools
increased the vulnerability of the rms codied information assets to spying attacks from "hackers,"
"cyberpunks," and even intelligence agencies.
3.5 KM policies come as a trade-o¤ between internal organizational constraints
and external competitive pressures
The management literature emphasizes the view that knowledge management has to balance between
internal organization constraints and external competition pressures (see Nickerson and Todd, 2002,
and Sanchez and Heene, 1998). As a matter of fact, the two-sided nature of soft information, both as
a source of contract incompleteness inside a relationship and as a source of protection against external
technological competition, is clearly illustrated by Sanchez and Heene (1998) in their literature survey
on "Managing Articulated Knowledge in competence-based competition". On the one hand they
acknowledge that : Much current discussion of knowledge in competence-based competition advances
the proposition that a rms "tacit knowledge" is more likely to be a source of competitive advantage
than the rms articulated or "non-tacit" knowledge [...] The di¢ culty of observing and acquiring
"tacit knowledge" limits its di¤usion beyond the rm [...]. This view is consistent with the idea that
information softness by reducing external informational spillover to competitors tends to provides
benets to the rm. At the same time though, Sanchez and Heene (1998) also emphasize that:
Relying on "tacit knowledge" as a source of strategic advantage limits the ability of a rm to leverage
its knowledge [...] the potential for leveraging is much greater when that knowledge can be articulated,
codied", suggesting therefore some internal e¢ ciency costs to the rm.
3.6 There is a recent decline in knowledge codication associated with IT di¤usion
A recent paper by Autor, Murnane and Levy (2003) provides direct evidence that there has been a
rise in non procedural activities since the 70s. Using samples of the CPS matched with representative
data on job tasks requirements from the Dictionnary of Occupational Titles (DOT), they show that
by 1998, non routine analytic task input averaged 6.8 centiles above its 1970 level and nonroutine
interactive input averaged 11.5 centiles above its 1970 level. The main point of their paper is that
this rise is pervasive at all educational levels and is accounted by the rapid di¤usion of computers at
the industry level. While Autor and al.s interpretation hinges on the fact that computers directly
substitute to procedural tasks at the rm level, this evidence is also consistent with the idea that
the spread of IT, by triggering competition and imitation at the industry level, induces rms to relax
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their degree of knowledge codication and increase agentsempowerment as a defensive competitive
strategy. As we will see this will be consistent with one of the main implications of the model.
4 The Setup
We consider a discrete time quality ladder growth model à la Grossman and Helpman (1991)
4.1 Goods and factors of production
In period s, there is a numeraire competitive nal good Ys using a continuum of intermediate goods xis
on the interval [0; 1] under a Cobb-Douglas technology log Ys =
R 1
0 log xis di: As usual, the per-period
demand for intermediate good i with price pis is given by:
xis =
Ys
pis
(1)
There are two types of production factors. First, there are H +1 entrepreneurs endowed with human
capital and are involved in innovation competition and rm management. Second, there is unskilled
labor in quantity L that is also freely mobile across sectors and used in project implementation and
production of the intermediate goods.
4.2 Preferences
The representative consumer is endowed with the following intertemporal separable utility function:
Ut =
P+1
s=t (1 + )
 (s t) [Ys   es] where Ys corresponds to date s consumption and es to the nominal
cost of e¤ort. We assume3 that the shadow price of e¤ort increases at the growth rate of this economy:
es+1 = (1 + gs)es: There is a perfect credit market. Therefore, given the intertemporal linearity
structure of preferences, the equilibrium real interest rate r is such that r = , the discount factor.
4.3 Technological Change and competition
In each industry i; at each period s there is an endogenous amount His + 1 of entrepreneurs who
are involved in technological competition in that sector. After discovering a leading-edge project, an
entrepreneur must implement the project by creating a rm and hiring workers. When ruling a rm,
that entrepreneur cannot undertake at the same time some research e¤ort. Hence research will be
done by the His entrepreneurs who are not currently managing a rm.
3Given that e¤ort enters additively into the utility function of the representative consumer, this assumption allows
the existence of a constant steady state growth equilibrium path. It could be justied by saying that e¤ort could
alternatively be allocated to home production, whose productivity grows at the same rate as the rest of the economy
because of exogenous spillovers e¤ects from market to home production.
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We assume that in each period, each of the innovating entrepreneurs has a Poisson rate of success
that depends on whether he benets or not from informational spillover from the leading-edge rm
in his sector. More specically, we assume that a given entrepreneur has a probability  2 ]0; 1[ to
receive such informational spillover. In such a case, his success rate of innovation is (1 + "i)0 where
"i captures the endogenous degree of knowledge spillover within industry i: We discuss below how
the spillover parameter "i can be partially manipulated by the leading edge rm in order to reduce
the probability of being destroyed. With the residual probability 1   , the entrepreneur just enjoys
a benchmark success rate 0: We see that  therefore captures the easiness with which rms can
learn crucial information on their competitors through reverse-engineering, "competitive intelligence"
strategies or "industrial espionage" as described in section 3. An increase in  could capture the
rise of communication and information technologies in the economy.4 From this, it follows that the
per period rate of competitive pressure is; which stands for the probability for a new project to be
discovered in an industry i; is simply given by
is = (1  )0His + (1 + "i)0His = 0(1 + "i)His: (2)
Entrepreneurs can freely choose the sector in which they wish to undertake research. Active
innovation in all sectors i 2 [0; 1] implies therefore the following arbitrage condition :
0 [(1  ) + (1 + "i)]Vis = 0 [(1  ) + (1 + "j)]Vjs for all (i; j) 2 [0; 1] (3)
where Vis is the rm value to be at the leading edge in sector i starting at time s (to be computed
later). Condition (3) simply says that the expected value of innovation should be the same across
sectors.
4.4 Production and Hold-up
Within each industry i; each new project enhances the productivity of the previous leading-edge
project by a parameter  with 0 < log  < 1: Then, within each period s; the leading edge rm
produces according to a two-stage process. Firstly, in the qualitystage, a set of strategic tasks must
be done in order to adapt the production process to changing environmental conditions. Secondly,
in the quantitystage, an amount l of workers are hired in order to produce with the leading-edge
technology:
yis = 
nis l (4)
where nis is the quality index of the leading edge-rm in period s such that nis corresponds to the
productivity of this rm. Firms unit cost of production is equal to cis = ws=nis where ws is the
competitive wage prevailing on the labor market.
4As already mentionned, Boni and Kovacich (2000) suggest that this enhanced use of IT and communication network-
ing tools would increase the possibility of "netspionage" and the vulnerability of the rms codied information assets
that can be accessed by competitors through these communication tools.
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Consider rst the "quantity" stage. Due to limit-pricing in Bertrand competition between the new
project and the previous one, the price pis charged by the new rm is equal to cis where cis is the new
rms unit cost of production at time s. Using (1), this means that each project generates a cash-ow
equal to :
is = (1   1):Ys (5)
Consider now the qualitystage. It needs to be undertaken by an Agent, hired on the unskilled
labor market, whose job consists in implementing a set of strategic tasks j 2 [0; 1] : All tasks must be
correctly implemented otherwise production does not take place. For each task j; correct implementa-
tion requires that the Agent undertakes5 a time-dependent correctaction ajs at a cost es:
In the qualitystage, there is some room for opportunism because we assume that: (1) the Agent
is always able to undertake, at zero cost, a wrong action aj ; (2) the quality (ie. corrector wrong)
and the costs (ie. es or 0) of actions aj are not veriable by an outside party6. Consequently, in
absence of a blueprint or a contract describing ex-ante the correct actions ajs for each date s; there is
an hold-up problem. If the agent undertakes the correct action ajs at cost es; the rm has an incentive
to deny the quality of her action in order not to pay her ex-post: Anticipating this, the agent has
incentives to undertake a wrong action at zero cost.
4.5 The role of codication: from soft to hard information.
Strategic information of the leading-edge rm in a given sector i corresponds to fajsg, the set of
correct actions (or best practices as usually denoted in the management literature). Initially this
set of information is appropriated by the entrepreneur only (because she is the successful innovator).
The purpose of the KM policy is to share this piece of information with the Agent who needs it to
implement correctly the qualitystage.
As emphasized in the existing empirical literature, we consider two types of KM policies: (1) face-
to-face interaction: for a given task j; information remains soft and at each date s, the entrepreneur
gives to the Agent only the bit of soft information ajs: There is no direct communication cost. (2)
codication: for a given task j; at the beginning of the relationship, the entrepreneur gives to the Agent
a blueprint (or a code of procedures) specifying the correct actions for all periods and contingencies
fajsg8s2(1;2;:::). Hence soft information is made hard. There is no direct cost of codication. The KM
policy implemented by the entrepreneur mixes both strategies. For the leading-edge rm in a given
5We assume that the set of possible actions is so wide that an Agent ignoring ex-ante ajs has no chance of implementing
correctly task j: Moreover ajs evolves in an unpredictable way such that learning by the Agent is not possible.
6Contracts could be made contingent on the quality of the product or the amount of sales. The hold up problem
would then disappear. To restore the hold up problem, we would need then to assume that there are n managers per
rm and that quality is the result of the joint e¤ort of the n managers. Hence the impact of a particular manager on
total quality could not be inferred.
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sector i; a share i of the continuum [0; 1] of tasks is kept under soft information and is transmitted
through face-to-faceinteraction, while a share (1  i) is codied. The choice of i is made at the
beginning of the discovery of the leading-edge technology and is irreversible.
Codication benets to internal e¢ ciency. Indeed, by transforming soft information into hard
information (ie. the blueprint), codication allows to write down a formal contract describing the set
of correct actions which have to be done by the Agent; this consequently solves the hold-up problem
for the (1  i) codied tasks only.
Codication however has a cost in term of information leakage. As suggested by the KM literature,
codied information assets are more vulnerable to external di¤usion to competitors, especially so with
the increased use of IT, Internet and communication technologies. First, codied knowledge can be
more easily attacked from the exterior by competitors, hackers and industrial spies. Second, there is a
basic increased vulnerability in the transformation problem from soft (non veriable) information to
hard (veriable) information. Information leakage cannot be perfectly contracted upon, in the sense
that information leakage is neither completely observable nor itself veriable. Indeed, the third party
(ie. the lawyer or consultant) who writes down and certies the contract cannot fully commit not
to reveal to an outside competitor the codied information enclosed in the contract whether through
legal or illegal means. Also, the Agent may be able to transmit a piece of hard information to an
outside competitor without being convicted7. The Agent could nally alternatively use the knowledge
himself to compete successfully with the leading-edge rm. In a context with imperfect credit markets,
this agent might not be able to fully fund the project himself. In such a case, he will get better credit
conditions if he can convince potential creditors that his project is viable and competitive. This is of
course more likely when he can supply hard information and codied knowledge emanating from the
leading-edge rms project.
To sum up, these di¤erent channels are likely to increase the probability of di¤usion of hard and
codied information compared to soft information. We capture this by assuming that the industry-
level knowledge spillover "i depend positively on the share (1  i) of hard information and that this
immediately and costlessly spreads with some probability  to the competitorspopulation (in mass
Hi). Formally, we assume that the spillover "i takes the simple form "i = (1  i) with 0(:) > 0 and
"(:) < 0. Together with (2) this leads to the following competitive pressure rate:
is( i
( )
) = 	 (i)His (6)
with 	  0 + 0(1  i) such that 	0 < 0 and 	00 < 0.
We see that the degree of information softness i stands either for the degree of contractual incom-
pleteness and the size of spillover. This dual aspect comes basically from the fact that codication (ie.
switching from soft to hard information) enables the design of more precise contracts but simultaneously
7The case previously discussed by Simm and Ferdinand (2006) of about 25 000 Lockheeds condential documents
transmitted to Boeing is a suggestive example of the importance of such possibility.
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promotes informational leakage.
The trade-o¤ faced by the rm is then pretty clear. Despite the underlying hold-up problem the
rm may still choose to keep part of information soft (ie. i > 0) to reduce information spillover
and competitive pressures. In that case, the rm must use an alternative instrument to mitigate the
hold-up problem. Relational contracts (ie. repeated interactions between the rm and the Agent)
or the ownership structure (as studied by the incomplete contracting literature, Grossman and Hart
1986) are two possible alternatives.
4.6 Steady-state
We focus on steady-state symmetric growth path equilibria across sectors such that8 8i; j; Vis = Vjs,
His = Hjs = H, i = j = , is = js =  () = 	 ()H: Moreover all the following variables grow
at the same pace g:
Ys = (1 + g)
sY0; es = (1 + g)
se, ws = (1 + g)s w, and Vis = Vjs = V (1 + g)s (7)
where g is the stationary growth rate prevailing in the economy and equal to9:
g = (): log  (8)
where (:) is given by equation (6). As  2 (0; 1); this equation shows that the equilibrium value of
g can take value only within the range [0; g] where g = (0): log . Finally, we assume for the sake of
computational simplicity that the growth rate g, the interest rate r and the creative destruction rate
 are small with respect to 1: This amounts to saying that the length of periods is short enough so
that our discrete model behaves almost as a standard continuous time models of growth.10
5 The basic results
This section studies the two instruments used by the rm for solving the hold up problem, namely
relational contracts and ownership structure. We provide here only the sketch of the argument: all
technical details are given in the appendix.
8This comes immediately from the human capital resource constraint
1R
0
Hisdi = H:
9The steady-state growth rate g is computed as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) (see chapter 4 for details). Denoting
nis the degree of quality prevailing at date s in industry i: From limit pricing we get that the price in each industry is
equal to pis = ws=nis 1 where ws is the competitive wage. Remind that the price index, Ps; is equal to: log(Ps) =R 1
0
log(pis):di: As Y is chosen as a numéraire, we get that log ws =
R 1
0
log
 
nis 1

:di and the stationary rate of growth
is given by g =  log :
10As the reader will soon gure out, the focus on discrete time is motivated by our desire to model the relationships
within the rm as a repeated game, the analysis of which is much easier in discrete time.
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5.1 In-house relational contracts
Consider now relational employment contracts inside the organization. At the beginning of the rela-
tionship the rm designs a contract. This contract codies a share (1  ) of the tasks and species a
wage schedule fwsg which has to be paid to the agent whenever theses tasks are correctly done. Hence
the contractual payment fwsg is contingent to only a share of the total set of tasks. With regards to
the non codied part  of know-how, the agent is free to undertake them (at a total cost es) as
this part of the job is not described in the contract.
The underlying opportunism problem can be solved through relational contracts. The agent is
willing to undertake the non codied actions (despite the threat of hold-up) if she expects to get a
compensation for her non contractual e¤ort. This compensation takes the form of a non contractual
wage !s (a bonus) that the rm gives ex-post. As a consequence, an employment relational contract
implicitly species two things. First, the agent must undertake at each date s the correct actions on
the full set of tasks [0; 1] : Second, the agent receives in exchange a sequence of wage payments (ws;
!s) where ws is the formal component paid when the agent proceeds with the right veriable actions
(on the share (1   ) of codied tasks), and !s is a promised non contractual wage paid when the
agent executes the right job on the  remaining non codied tasks. That contract needs to be self
enforcing for the two parties. Therefore, it should satisfy a) incentive compatibility constraints, both
for the agent and the rm, b) the agents individual rationality constraint.
The agents incentive constraint: Focusing on detrended stationary contracts along a stationary
growth path, it can be shown that for small values of r;  and g; the incentive compatibility constraint
of an agent writes as:
e  ! + w + !   e  w
r +    g (MIC)
This has a straightforward interpretation. The one period gain from cheating11 (saving the e¤ort cost
e on non veriable tasks) should be less that the value of not cheating. The latter is the sum of
the bonus ! received at the end of the period and the expected discounted gains of the cooperative
employment relationship in the future. Condition [MIC] clearly shows that any share  of information
softness can be sustained from the agents point of view as soon as the bonus ! is su¢ ciently large.
Unfortunately, the rm will tend to renege on large values of ! and this instrument is di¢ cult to
enforce from the rms point of view (see below).
The rms incentive constraint: Similarly the rms incentive constraint can be written as:
!     w   !
r +    g (FIC)
The one period gain from cheating12 on the agent and not paying the bonus !, has to be less than
11After cheating, the agent is red by the rm and goes back to the labor market with a bad reputation. This
reputation prevents her to be hired by other rms as a manager and thus constraints her to earn the reservation wage
w (see appendix for all the details).
12After cheating on the agent, the rm gets a bad reputation and no agent will accept to work for the rm as a
manager. The rm is thus unable to produce anymore and gets 0 cash-ow (see appendix for all the details).
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the expected discounted value of the cooperative relationship to the rm (ie. the RHS). This equation
clearly illustrates the trade-o¤ in term of incentives from the rms point of view. The larger is the
ex-post non-contractual wage !, the more the rm wants to renege. The larger is the net surplus of
the relationship the more the rm wants to cooperate.
The agents participation constraint: The per period value of employment w+! e must be equal
to, or larger than, the opportunity cost of working as a production worker w: The appendix shows
that the optimal contract is such that the participation constraint is always binding:
w + !   e = w (PC)
For a given stationary growth rate g 2 (0; g); the optimal problem of the rm is to maximizes its
expected discounted value with respect to information softness  under (PC)-(MIC)-(FIC), which in
detrented value is equal to:
V =Max

   e  w
r + ()  g
Given that the rate of creative destruction () is decreasing in ; the rm wants to implement the
largest possible value of : Plunging (PC) in conditions (MIC) and (FIC), this means that the optimal
 and ! are given by the largest value of  such that: e  !   e  wr+ g : This gives:
Result 1: Under in-house relational contracts, the optimal contract is such that: a) the contractual
wage compensates the agent for the codied share of know-how only, w = (1   )e + w; b) the non
contractual wage compensates for the non veriable share of know-how ; ! = e: The optimal degree
of information softness (g) is below 1; is increasing with the growth rate g and is such that:
e =
   e  w
r + ()  g (9)
The intuition is the following. Given that the rate of creative destruction () is decreasing in
the degree information softness ; the rm would like to implement the largest possible value of
 sustainable through a relational contract (w;!): The sustainability of  is however restricted by
the fact that the non contractual bonus ! has a limited impact: A large ! always provides correct
incentives to the agent (see MIC), but not to the rm who may have interest to renege on ! instead
of rewarding the agent. Given the absence of a commitment device from the rms point of view,
the latter has to choose a value of  strictly less than 1 (codication of information) to mitigate the
internal hold up problem.
An increase in the growth rate g tends to increase the degree of information softness . Intuitively,
the larger the growth rate g; the more valuable the future cash-ows and wages. It is then important
both for the rm and the agent not to renege now in order to enjoy the gains from future cooperation.
Cooperation becomes easier for both sides and, consequently a larger degree of softness is sustainable.
We call capitalization e¤ect this positive impact of growth on information softness.
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Note nally that in this type of employment relationship, the rms present value writes as:
V in(g) =
   e  w
r + ()  g (10)
5.2 Joint ownership and Empowerment
So far, the problem of a two-sided hold-up inside the rm was solved by the use of relational contracts
and reputation based incentives. An alternative is to empower the agent by making a transfer of
ownership in his favor. In that case, the rm does not rely on repeated interactions and relational
contracts but on static ex-post bargaining power which is transferred to the agent, as for instance
studied in the incomplete contracting literature13. Transfer of ownership a¤ects the status quo points of
the two parties compared to in-house employment contracts and therefore may have strong implications
on the ex ante incentives.
As before, at the beginning of the relationship the rm decides its level of informational softness
 , taking as given the rest of the economy. Under Joint Participation, the agent owns his production
such that p is the price at which the agent will sell production to the rm. This price will be
negotiated ex post between the two parties at the end of the spot relationship. We assume also that
the agent has a limited liability constraint14. Finally we assume that joint-ownership does not increase
communication costs between the rm and the agent.15 As already said, for the rm the benet of
transferring ownership to the worker comes from the fact that the hold up problem is partially solved
in a one-shot interaction. Therefore, the rm is able to sustain a higher level of information softness
and can protect better its incumbent position against technological competition. The cost of joint
ownership is the fact that the rm now looses some rents (whereas in the in-house relationship it was
capturing the whole surplus).
Consider now the price p at which the agent sells his production to the rm. This price is xed
after a bilateral bargaining stage which maximizes the joint surplus : Outside options of both agents
are zero and we immediately get that: p = 2 .
The agent receives p only when the overall quality is achieved. Given that the surplus of the
relationship is assumed to be large enough, ie. =2   e > w; (see assumption A3 in appendix), the
agent always undertakes the full degree of e¤ort whatever the degree of softness of information. As
a consequence, the rm is able to sustain, under joint ownership, an extreme level of softness  = 1
in order to reduce information leakage. From the rms point of view, the surplus is equal to =2 at
13Here we consider only the case of spot outsourcing contracts in which the rm decides to transmit ownership to the
agent of tasks the latter is supposed to produce (the rm keeps ownership on the remaining tasks). See Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (2002) for a discussion on relational outsourcing contracts.
14 In our present setting, the assumption of limited liability implies that there could not be an ex-ante license fee, W;
that the agent pays to the rm in order to get the right to produce for the rm. It is therefore not possible for the rm
to achieve its rst best contract under joint ownership.
15This assumption allows us to concentrate again on the role of external competitive pressures in the design of the opti-
mal organizational structure of the rm. Clearly all we say will still qualitatively be valid if the increased communication
costs between the agent and the rm due to joint ownership are not too large.
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each date. Hence the rms intertemporal total surplus is equal to:
V out(g) =
=2
r + (1)  g (11)
Result 2: Assume that =2  e > w: Under joint ownership: a full degree of information softness
can be sustained, ie.  = 1; and is actually implemented by the rm.16
5.3 KM-policy and the choice of organization
Let us now consider the optimal choice of organizational form between in-house production (based on
a relational employment contract) and joint ownership along a stationary growth path characterized
by a given growth rate g. The rm decides to share ownership whenever:
V out(g)  V in(g)
where V in is given by (22) and (10); and V out is given by (11). This condition writes as:
r + (1)  g
r + (in)  g 
=2
   e  w (12)
Hereafter we denote ~g the growth rate value such that the previous condition holds as an equality. In
the appendix we show the following:
Result 3: For 0  g  ~g; in-house production is preferred while for ~g  g  g, joint ownership is
preferred.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The relative cost of joint ownership compared to in-
house production comes from a reduced ow of income in each period. The relative advantage of joint
ownership comes from the increased capacity to sustain softness which reduces the probability to be
technologically leapfrogged by a competitor. This in turn increases the expected lifetime of the rm.
This relative advantage is all the more valuable to the rm that it enjoys a large capitalization e¤ect
of its asset value along its life time. The larger the growth rate, the larger the capitalization e¤ect
and the larger the relative advantage of the joint ownership organizational form. When the growth
rate is small, the capitalization e¤ect is weak and in-house production tends to dominate because of
the larger ows of income that the rm receives. Hence this result illustrates how the KM-policy of a
rm and its organizational structure in term of ownership are closely interrelated.
Figure 1 depicts the KM-curve, namely (g) the rm level choice of softness with respect to g. For
g < ~g, (g) is given by condition (22); it is upward sloping because of the capitalization e¤ect under
relational contracting. For g > ~g, (g) = 1 under joint ownership. At g = ~g rms are indi¤erent17
between the two organizational strategies; this is represented by the vertical segment on the gure.
16Clearly in the presence of communication costs under joint ownership, the previous result would be less extreme, as
the rm would benet from increasing codication in order to reduce these costs.
17At g = eg the rm is indi¤erent and relies on mixed strategy: In-house strategy is chosen with a probability : This
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5.4 Macroeconomic equilibrium
In this section we solve for the macroeconomic variables which play a key role in the previous analysis,
e.g. the growth rate g and the competitive rate w: The demand for labor has two components: a
demand for (supervising) Agents which is always equal to 1 and a demand for (producing) workers,
which is, under limit pricing, equal to Ys= ws: Consequently the labor market clearing condition is:
L = 1 + Ys= ws (14)
Along a stationary growth path, Yt and wt grow at the same rate g with Ys = (1 + g)sY and ws =
(1 + g)s w. It follows that the market clearing condition boils down to : L = 1 + Y= w.
Moreover from limit-pricing by monopolies we know that  w = P: But the price of the nal good
is the numeraire. It follows that the competitive wage is such that w =  1: Plunging back this
term into the market clearing condition, we get Y = L   1: From equation (5), the detrended value
of cash-ow can be written as  = (1    1):(L   1); the net surplus of the rm is thus equal to
S     e  w = (1  1=)(L  1)  e   1: As a consequence the macro equilibrium is characterized
by two conditions.
First, the aggregate spillover condition ties down the value of the stationary growth rate to the
rm choice of softness of information. It is simply given by condition (8):
g = ( 
( )
): log  (AS)
where (:) is given by equation (6).
Second, the KM-condition associates the rm level choice of  to the aggregate rate of growth.
This KM-condition has been studied in the previous section and is given by (12) and (22) which,
together with labor market clearing condition, writes as:
e =
S
r + ()  g for g < ~g; (KM)
 = 1 for g  ~g
where ~g is given by the equality in condition (12).
On gure 1, the upward sloping curve (KM) corresponds to the KM condition while the downward
sloping curve (AS) corresponds to the aggregate spillover curve. We get the immediate result
Result 4: A steady state equilibrium always exists and is unique.
probability must be compatible with the aggregate growth rate ~g as given by (8). This means that  is such that:
~g = log : [((~g)) + (1  )(1)] (13)
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Depending on the locus of the KM curve and the AS curve, three di¤erent types of equilibria may
emerge: a in-house relational equilibrium, a joint ownership equilibrium one and an equilibrium where
both types of organizational forms coexist.
6 Comparative statics and extensions
In this section we perform various comparative statics relying on graphical support. All computational
details are given in the appendix.
6.1 The Bell-shaped evolution of knowledge codication
We start our comparative statics exercises with the impact of the long run evolution of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT). As discussed in the empirical literature (see section 3), the
spread of ICTs has increased the relative speed of di¤usion and transmission of hard information. In
our framework (see section 4.3 and condition 2) the knowledge spillover spreads to competitors with
a probability . We therefore interpret  as the e¢ ciency of ICTs.
On gure 2, an increase in  has a direct e¤ect on the aggregate spillover curve (AS) which shifts
upwards. For a given  an improvement in ICTs e¢ ciency increases informational spillover and
thus the aggregate growth rate of the economy. The e¤ect on the KM-curve is less obvious. First,
it unambiguously reduces (0; ~g) which corresponds to the range of the growth rate where in-house
production is preferred to joint ownership by rms. The reason is that the increase in ICTs e¢ ciency
makes, for a given degree ; the cost of information leakage more important. Firms therefore try to
reduce codication. This is done by switching from in-house production to joint ownership (where
 = 1 is sustainable). Hence ICTs di¤usion promotes joint ownership.
Second, within the in-house regime, there is a creative destruction e¤ect that stands for the fact
that an increase in  directly increases competitive pressure  at the microeconomic level; this in turn
makes relational contracts less sustainable for a given g. This reduces the degree of soft information
 which can be sustained with relational contracts and corresponds to a downward shift of the KM
curve within the range (0; ~g).
Summarizing, for low values of ; an increase in  maintains rst the economy within the in-house
regime but decreases : On the other hand for large values of ; an increase in  promotes the joint
ownership regime and increases . As a result, the degree of codication is a bell-shaped curve with
respect to the e¢ ciency of ICTs (see gure 3).
Given equations (6) and (AS), the growth rate is given by g = [1 + (1  i)] 0H log : An
increase in  has a direct e¤ect on g through an increase in the scope of informational spillover. But
it also has an indirect e¤ect through the endogenous shift in the degree of codication . While
the direct e¤ect is always positive, the indirect e¤ect is positive (resp. negative) when the degree of
codication (resp. softness) is endogenously promoted by the di¤usion of ICTs. Both e¤ects go in the
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same direction as long as the economy remains in the in-house regime. Hence, growth increases with
ICTs e¢ ciency. On the contrary, when softness increases, this last feature does not hold anymore
along the transition from the in-house regime to the joint ownership regime (a look at gure 3 should
convince the reader that the indirect e¤ect dominates). In this transitory regime, growth decreases
with ICTs. Finally, when the whole economy has shifted toward joint ownership, information is only
under a soft form ( = 1) and consequently the increase in  has no e¤ect anymore in the growth
rate, neither through the direct e¤ect nor the indirect one (see gure 3).
All this discussion may be summarized as follows:
Result 5: When  increases , the economy switches from a in-house equilibrium to a joint ownership
equilibrium. There is a Bell-shaped relationship between the level of information codication (1   )
and : Finally, there is a decrease in the aggregate growth rate during the transition phase from the
in-house regime to the joint ownership regime (see gure 3) .
This result suggests that ICTs may not necessarily a¤ect positively growth and the scope of
informational spillover, when rms adjust endogenously their KM policies. More precisely, the di¤usion
of ICTs can strengthen the threat of informational spillover so much that in reaction, rms reduce the
degree of codication of their know-how. This in turn results in a decrease in aggregate knowledge
spillover and a reduced growth rate.
This comparative statics is suggestive of the after war period of economic expansion. The Mass
Production regime corresponds, in our framework, to a regime of high growth, high codication, large
informational spillover and internal incentives sustained by intertemporal labor contracts whereas the
Knowledge based Economy is initially characterized by a improvement of ICTs e¢ ciency, a produc-
tivity slowdown , a switch toward more information softness and internal incentives sustained by
"empowered" spot labor contracts. It is also somehow consistent with the dramatic change of cor-
porate structures in the late 80s and during the 90s and the corresponding emergence of vertical
disintegration, joint ownership and the erosion of internal labor markets.
6.2 Growth and scale e¤ects
Consider now an increase of the stock of skilled workers H available for innovation and R&D in the
economy. It is rst worth noting that within our framework, an increase in H drives qualitatively the
same results18 as an increase in : Hence the following result :
Result 6: When the stock of skilled workers H increases , the economy switches from a in-house
equilibrium to a joint ownership equilibrium. There is a Bell-shaped relationship between the level of
information codication (1 ) and H: Finally, there is a decrease in the aggregate growth rate during
the transition phase from the in-house regime to the joint ownership regime.
18All technical details are available from the authors upon request.
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A rst implication of this result is the fact that the dramatic rise in skilled workforce experi-
enced since the 1970s in many developed countries economies (see Acemoglu 2002 for a discussion)
could help explain the switch form Mass production to Knowledge based Economy and the observed
transformations in rmsorganizations.
More interestingly, the non monotonic comparative statics on the growth rate can be related to the
literature on scale e¤ects in endogenous growth models. The rst generation of endogenous growth
models (Romer 1990, Aghion and Howit 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991 was characterized by the
existence of strong scale e¤ects, namely the fact that the growth rate of an economy is an increasing
function of its size or positively related to the stock of resources available for innovation and R&D.
While the very long run history of economic growth appears consistent with the existence of strong
scale e¤ects (see Kremer, 1993), they are inconsistent with the relative stability of growth rates in the
United States in the 20th century (though the stock of researchers has steadily increased during the
same period). Nor do they match stylized recent cross country evidence on growth patterns. Models
getting rid of growth scale e¤ects have been developed in the literature. However, either these models
are semi endogenous growth models (Jones 1995, Segerstrom 1998) with policy invariant growth rates,
either these models maintain the potency of policy to alter long run growth (Young 1998, Dinopoulos
and Thompson 1998, Howitt 1999) at the cost of several knife-edge assumptions (for a survey, see
Jones 2005).
Our present setting starts with a work-horse model of endogenous growth model generating growth
scale e¤ects (putting therefore ourselves in the worst possible situation to reduce them). Still, adding
endogenous informational ows (soft versus hard) and their implications for the structure of knowledge
spillover in the economy, triggers ambiguous scale e¤ects in growth. In particular, our approach
suggests that the strength of scale e¤ects in idea-based growth models can be mitigated by the changing
nature of informational ows. Moreover, in our context, this aspect is most likely to occur when we
have high di¤usion of ICTs technologies and/or an already large stock of research personnel in the
economy. These last facts seem to t relatively well the evolution of OECD countries in the last 40
years, period for which strong scale e¤ects on growth seem to be the least relevant.
Finally, it is worth noting that an additional feature of our current approach is the fact that long
run growth (even with ambiguous strong scale e¤ects) can still be a¤ected by policy variables. Indeed,
in this setting, growth depends on the nature of informational ows which in turn is a function
of institutional and policy variables a¤ecting the environment of the rm (patent laws, ownership
structures, labor contracts laws). Therefore, there still remains scope for policy impacts on long run
growth in a context somewhat more generic than other scale free endogenous growth models. 19
19See in particular Jones (2004) p. 47 for an insighful discussion of these models.
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6.3 Social embeddedness
In a celebrated book, Saxenian (1996) analyzes the relative performance of Silicon Valley and Route
128 during the 80s. The cornerstone of her analysis is that di¤erent cultures and social embededdness
within these areas are key variables to explain the observed patterns of organizations (within and
between rms) and the observed scope of informational spillover which ultimately explain global
performance of each area.
The broad picture is the following. On the one hand, Silicon Valley during the 80s was characterized
by a culture20 of sharing technical informations which resulted in: i/ a rapid di¤usion of knowledge
through face-to-face interactions and high labor turnover, ii/ a network of small rms with informal
internal organization and close links with their outside suppliers21. On the other hand, Route 128 was
characterized by a East-coast type of puritan culture where loyalty to the rm and reputation was
enforced by a strict social control which resulted in: i/ life long employment and internal labor market
ii/ big vertically integrated rms with iii/ high degree of internal codication and hierarchization22.
In this section, we briey discuss how our framework can be amended to capture this link between
social embeddedness, knowledge spillover and rms internal organization. The literature on social
networks has highlighted two channels through which social networks a¤ect individual behavior: norms
and information: the social norm channel emphasizes how a persons behavior is a¤ected by social and
peer pressure within the network while the information channel emphasizes how a persons knowledge
depends on the network she belongs to.
The information channel is associated to the fact that social network tend to speed the spread
of information, either hard or soft, through face-to-face interactions or social gathering. Analytically,
this issue is very much the same as the one discussed above on the impact of ICTs di¤usion. Similar
results apply and, consequently a culture of information sharing promotes joint ownership and has
non monotonic e¤ect on the degree of softness.
The social norm channel relates to the absence of anonymity and the existence of social reputation,
which by triggering collective retaliation in case of defection, plays a key role in sustaining cooperation
within relational contracts. Hence, the strength and persistence of reputation is in some ways similar
to the existence of social pressure. Social pressure obviously a¤ects positively the sustainability of
cooperation of the in-house regime with relational contracts between the entrepreneur and the agent.
The larger it is, the more stringent is retaliation by society in case of cheating. At the same time
20 see chapter 2 where Saxenian describes the Silicon Valley as a technical community where informal conversations
were pervasive and served as an important source of up-to-date information about competitors, customers markets, and
technologies.
21See the chapter entitled Route 128: independence and hierarchy, where it is said that Route 128s technology
enterprises imitated the structure of the traditional mass production corporation. While Silicons Valley entrepreneurs
rejected the corporate practices of the large, established East Coast producers".
22See chapter 3 where it is argued that the managers of Route 128 technology companies [...] created organizations
characterized by formal decisionmaking procedures and management styles, loyal long-term employees and conservative
workplace procedures.
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however, it plays no role under joint ownership. In that case, the hold-up ine¢ ciency due to softness is
solved through an increase in the worker spot bargaining power due to a partial transfer of ownership.
In the appendix, we present a simple formal extension of these ideas and show that the equilibrium
is described by equations similar to (AS) and (KM). Two features can be simply deduced from the
analysis. First, the larger the degree of social pressure, the larger the degree of softness which can be
sustained for a given growth rate g: This corresponds to an upward shift of the KM-curve (see gure
4). Second, the larger the degree of social pressure; the larger the range (0; ~g) of growth rates for which
in-house production is preferred to joint ownership. Hence initially, if the economic equilibrium is at
E0 as shown in gure 4 with joint ownership and full softness of information (ie.  = 1), an increase
in social pressures , is going to generate a mixed equilibrium along the vertical part of the KM curve,
with the fraction of in-house production rms increasing overtime. As  goes up, the threshold rate
~g increases and the equilibrium point moves down along the AS curve. Hence as long as one stays
within the mixed production regime, an increase in  leads to a decrease in information softness  and
an increase in the equilibrium growth rate g. This process goes on until we reach a "full in-house"
equilibrium where the AS curve intersects the KM curve on its upward sloping part.(as shown for
instance by point E1). Then in this full "in-house" production regime, as the upward sloping part
of KM is shifted up with an increase in , the equilibrium point E1 moves up along the AS curve,
implying now an increase in information softness and a reduction of the equilibrium growth rate g.
The preceding discussion can then be therefore summarized in the following result:
Result 7: An increase in the degree of social pressure promotes in-house production. Information
softness within the economy is rst decreasing and then increasing with the degree of social pressure.
Conversely, the growth rate of the economy rst increases and then decreases with the degree of social
pressure.
7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate one facet of the incentives for organizations to keep
soft informational ows or to codify part of them. We emphasize a trade-o¤ shaped by the conict be-
tween internal incentives and external competitive pressures. This provides a natural channel through
which competition has some impact on rms organizational structure and informational ows. Because
of the consequences for knowledge spillover in the rest of the economy, the nature of informational
ows inside organizations has in turn feedback e¤ects on macroeconomic performances and growth.
In order to illustrate these mechanisms in the most simple way, we abstracted from many other
facets of the problem of soft information and its di¤usion into society. First, we abstracted from
technological constraints related to costs of communication and costs of codication. Introducing
them would add another margin the rm needs to take into account in its decisions to codify or not
some of its knowledge stock. Secondly, our framework consider simple contracting settings and one
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may wish to extend our analysis to more complex environments. For instance, one may think to
investigate more systematically the role of social networks and communities to stabilize the problems
of opportunism based on soft information. The degree of codication of information inside and across
organizations will then be shaped by the structure of social links. In turn, one may expect the structure
of social networks to be dependent on the nature of informational ows spreading between them.
Finally, our setting endogenize knowledge spillover in a rather crude way. In particular, we do not
provide a precise microfounded description of the process through which hard information gets di¤used
in the society. This could be due to labor market turnover, migration, industrial spying, informational
spillover from regulating parties, etc. Understanding precisely these mechanisms is certainly an impor-
tant line for future research. We hope that incorporating such extensions into our setting could then
be helpful to improve our understanding of the nature of knowledge spillover and their implications
in various economic areas like international trade, FDI, economic geography or development.
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Technical Appendix
A Equilibrium Analysis
In order to simplify the computations, some assumptions related to the value of parameters are useful.
A0 : log  < 1
A1 : 8 2 [0; 1]; () < 1; 0() < 0; 00() < 0;
A2 :
(1  1)(L 1) e  1
r+(1) (0) log  < e=3
A3 : (   1)(L  1) > 2(e+ 1)
Assumptions A0 and A1 are standard. Assumption A2 ensures that a full degree of softness (ie. = 1)
cannot be sustained under in-house regime. Assumption A3 ensures that the joint ownership regime
is sustainable.
A.1 In-house relational employment contracts
We make the following informational assumptions. All workers and rms know the identity of rms
and employees in all previous periods as long as the rm is still into business. As soon as the employers
project is leapfrogged and disappears, the reputation of that particular rm and all the agents who
have been employed by that employer vanish. Both agents go back to anonymity. In other words, we
suppose that reputation is project-specic.
At each date, a worker knows all his history of wage payments !t and wt and work performances
in a given employment relationship. He also knows whether a rm, which he has been employed in
any past period, has delivered any promised non contractual payment !t. At each date, each rm
knows the history of past wage payments !t and wt paid to all his past workers and also knows the
work performances history of its employees whilst employed with the rm.
An employment relational contract species that the agent must undertake at each date t the right
action on the full set of tasks [0; 1] and will receive in exchange a sequence of wage payments (wt;
!t) where wt is the formal component paid when the agent has made the right veriable actions on
the share (1   ) of the hard tasks and !t is a promised non contractual wage paid when the agent
has made the part of the job on the  remaining non codied tasks. That contract needs to be self
enforcing for the two parties. It should therefore satisfy incentive compatibility constraints both for
the agent and the rm and the agents individual rationality constraint.
The agents incentive constraint:
Let consider an agent hired at date t: At any further date t+s; the incentive compatibility constraint
of the agent should make sure that the agent derives a higher discounted utility from not shirking
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than shirking. This can be written as:
wt+s   (1  )et+s +
1X
=1
(1  )
(1 + r)
wt+s+
 wt+s + !t+s   et+s +
1X
=1
(1  )
(1 + r)
[wt+s+ + !t+s+   et+s+ ]
Assuming that the rm pays the relational contract in each period, when the agent does not shirk, he
will earn wt+s+ + !t+s+   et+s+ with   0 as long as the project remains on the leading edge. If
he cheats at t + s, he undertakes an e¤ort only on the hard share of tasks, faces a cost (1   )et+s
and receives only the contractual wage wt+s: However he will be dismissed by the rm and goes back
to the market with a badreputation.23 He will get only the reservation wage wt+s+ as long as the
project is on the leading edge for  > 0: .This condition can be written as:
et+s  !t+s +
1X
=1
(1  )
(1 + r)
fwt+s+ + !t+s+   et+s+   wt+s+g (15)
>From Levin (2003) we know that in this environment, the detrended optimal contract is a stationary
contract such that ws = (1 + g)s twt and !s = (1 + g)s t!t: The previous constraint takes then a
simpler form:
et+s  !t+s +
1X
=1
(1  ) (1 + g)
(1 + r)
fwt+s + !t+s   et+s   wt+sg
This incentive constraint must be true at any date t + s after the hiring. Together with the steady
state condition, the agents incentive constraint becomes then (in detrented value):
e  ! + (1  ) (1 + g)
(1 + r)
0@w + !   e  w
1  (1 )(1+g)(1+r)
1A (16)
Note that when (16) holds, (15) holds for any date t + s after the hiring. Hence if the incentive
compatibility constraint is satised at the beginning of the relationship, it is also satised for periods
thereafter. For small values of r;  and g ((16)) becomes:
e  ! + w + !   e  w
r +    g (17)
The rms incentive constraint:
Let us consider now the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm. Consider again a relationship
beginning at date t: The rms incentive constraint corresponds to the case where at any further date
t+ s after the hiring date t; the return to cooperation always dominates the return to cheating. This
can be written as:
23We assume here that the market sanctionsbreaking matches by avoiding to deal with them. Firms will not hire
the deviantmanager as a manager and workers will not want to work as managers in a deviantrm. As the reason
for the break is because of some cheating on the tacit part of the contract, there is always an ambiguity on who is
responsible for such a break. In equilibrium, as managers will only receive their reservation payo¤s, it is then a weakly
dominant strategy for managers and rms in the market to avoid dealing with the parties which separated.
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t+s   wt+s + 0
 t+s   wt+s   !t+s +
1X
=1
(1  )
(1 + r)
[t+s+   wt+s+   !t+s+ ]
At any further date t + s; a cooperative rm receives t+s and compensates the agent by giving her
the contractual wage wt+s and the non-contractual wage !t+s: In that case cooperation between the
rm and the agent is sustained through time and the relationship lasts with the project. If the rm
decides to cheat at date t + s, the rm receives t+s; gives the contractual wage wt+s to the agent
but reneges on the noncontractual wage !t+s despite the agents cooperation. However at any further
date t+ s+  ; the rms reputation of being non reliable will spread through the market and no agent
will accept to cooperate with this rm; as the degree of codication is xed only once (at date t);
this means that the rm will be unable to produce correctly and will get zero cash-ow as long as the
project is on the leading edge for  > 0 .
Using again stationary contracts along a stationary growth path, we can rewrite the rms incentive
constraint in detrended terms as:
!     w
1 + r +    g (18)
The agents participation constraint:
Finally the contract has to satisfy the agent participation constraint. When hired by a rm, the
agent undertakes an e¤ort et for a compensation scheme wt + !t; his reservation wage (ie. employed
as a production worker) is wt: When the rm is destroyed, with a probability ; the agent goes back
to the labor market. Hence the agents participation constraint writes as:
1X
=0
(1  )
(1 + r)
fwt+s+ + !t+s+   et+s+g 
1X
=0
(1  )
(1 + r)
wt+s+
Along a stationary growth path and with stationary contracts, the agents participation constraint
collapses to:
w + !   e  w (19)
The set of contracts sustaining a given degree of softness 
Consider a given degree of softness  and let us call  (), the set of relational contracts (w;!)
which can sustain cooperation between the agent and the rm for this degree of softness.  () is
described in the space (w;!) by the constraints (17)-(18)-(19);  () is depicted on gure A1. It is
not empty as long as the agents constraint is below the rms constraint. Simple computations show
that it is the case i¤:
e     e  w
r + ()  g (20)
For a given  it is clear that the rm prefers to pay the smallest compensation scheme w + !: This
corresponds to contracts located on the segment OO0 where the agents participation constraint is
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binding24. Hence as soon  as is sustainable (ie. condition (20) is satised) the participation constraint
is binding, w+! = e+ w; and the rms captures the whole surplus of the relationship. In other words
the e¢ ciency wage policy is always dominated by the ex-post compensation policy: for a given ; the
rm always prefers to incite the agent through ! rather than through the e¢ ciency wage (w  e  w):
The reason is that the latter one is costly whereas both instruments are perfectly similar in terms
of incentive provision [ie. they are substitute either in the agents incentive constraint (see condition
MIC) and in the rms incentive constraint (see condition FIC)]25.
The optimal degree of softness for a given growth rate g 2 (0; g)
For a given contractual schemes fws; !sgst the rms intertemporal value is given by
Vt =
+1X
s=t
(1  ())(s t)
(1 + r)(s t)
[s   ws   !s]
where the competitive pressure () is given by () = f(:(1   );H). Firm maximizes this value
with respect to softness  under the constraints (17)-(18)-(19) which ensure that cooperation can
be sustained through a well designed labor contracts. In detrented value this means that the rms
objective function writes as: (
V =Max
w;!;
 w !
r+() g
s:t: fw;!g 2  () (21)
Let us characterize this optimal in: From the previous analysis of  (); we know that the par-
ticipation constraint is necessarily binding. If either the agents or the rms incentive constraint is
not binding,.this means the dimension of  (in) is 2 (see gure A1). Unambiguously this implies that
condition (20) cannot be an equality. This last point means that it is possible to nd a marginally
larger degree of softness, in +; which can be sustained by a relational contract (ie. satisfying the
condition (20)). As a consequence, in could not be the optimal contract. Hence at the optimal in,
all constraints are binding. Using equations (PC)-(MIC)-(FIC), this means that the optimal degree
of softness is the largest  such that:
:e     e  w
r + ()  g (22)
At the optimal degree ; all constraints are binding. Hence we get immediately e = ! and w =
(1  )e+ w:
Finally from equation (22), we may nd out (g) for g 2 (0; g); ie. the optimal degree of information
softness with respect to the growth rate. The degree of softness chosen under in-house production is
given by equation (22):
:e =
   e  w
r + ()  g (23)
24The case where the managers constraint does not intercept the managers participation constraint is not possible
because this corresponds to the impossible case where:
e[r +    g] + e+ w
1 + r +    g  e+ w
25Basically this result is linked to the fact that agents reputation does not last more than the rms reputation. They
value the future the same way.
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Let denote RHS(; g) the right-hand-side of (23). Clearly @RHS@g > 0: And 8g 2 [0; g]; RHS(0; g) 
(1  1)(L 1) e  1
r+(0)(1 log ) which is positive according to assumption A0: >From assumption A1 we get
@RHS
@ > 0 and
@2RHS
@2
> 0: Hence RHS(; g) is increasing and convex in : For a given g; equa-
tion (23) is depicted in gure A2. Two cases may happen. First: RHS(1; g) < e; this means that
there is one and only one  < 1 such that e = RHS(; g); this corresponds to the degree of infor-
mation softness chosen by the rm. Second: RHS(1; g) > e; this would mean that a full degree of
softness could be sustained; however assumption A2 implies that RHS(1; g) < e=3 < e; RHS being
increasing in g; this means that 8g 2 [0; g]; RHS(1; g) < e and so this case is impossible.
Di¤erentiating (23) we get:
(
d
dg
)= = [0() + r + ()  g] 1 (24)
A look at gure A2;case 1; should convince the reader that at the intercept  between the two
curves, the slope of e is larger than the slope of RHS(; g); hence @RHS=@ < e; this implies that
0() +  1:(r + ()  g) > 0 and so we get ddg > 0:
To sum up this section, we have shown that the implicit  in equation (22) is such that 8g 2 [0; g];
0(g) > 0 and (g) 2 [0; ] where  < 1:
A.2 In-House vs Joint Ownership
In the main text we show that joint-ownership is preferred to in-house production when:
r + ()  g
r + (1)  g 
   e  w
=2
(25)
where  is given by equation (23). Let W (g) and 
 be respectively the left-hand-side and the right-
hand-side of condition (25). Assumption A3 means that 
 > 1:
Consider now a point of indi¤erence ~g 2 [0; g] where condition (25) is an equality: W (~g) = 
:
An obvious di¤erentiation gives:
Sg(W 0(~g)) = Sg

(~)  (1) + 0(~):d
dg
:(r + (1)  ~g)

(26)
The sign of the right-hand-side of (26) is ambiguous as 8~ 2 [0; 1]; (~) > (1) but 0(~) < 0 and
d
dg :(r + (1)   ~g) > 0: However using the denition of ~g and equation (24), we have: Sg(W 0(~g)) =
Sg((~)   (1) + 0(~):(
:~ 1 + 0(~):~:2e=) 1) where ~ 2 [0; ]: From assumptions A1; A2 and A3
we get: Sg(W 0(~g))  Sg(()  (1) + 0():( 1 + 0():) 1):
But (:) being convex, the theorem of intermediate values guaranties that: 8 2 [0; 1]; (()  
(1)):(   1) 1  0(): Consequently we have: Sg(W 0(~g))  Sg(0():(2   1 + (()  (1))): By
denition,  is given by condition (23) with g = g  (0) log ; hence from assumption A2 we get that
  1=3 which implies that: Sg(W 0(~g))  0:
This last inequality means that at the point ~g where W (~g) = 
, the function W (:) is upward
sloping and W 0(~g)  0; but W (:) is continuous and di¤erentiable on [0; g]; consequently we know
that there is at most one point ~g 2 [0; g] such that W (~g) = 
: In that case 8g 2 [0; ~g];W (~g)  

and 8g 2 [~g; g];W (~g)  
: From condition (25) this means that V IN (g)  V OUT (g) if g  ~g; and
V OUT (g)  V IN (g) if g  ~g where ~g is the only point on [0; g] where condition (25) is an equality.
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B Comparative Statics
B.1 ICTs
The variable  impacts the economy through (:) which according to equation (6) is given by () =
[1 + (1  i)] 0H. The equilibrium is characterized by equations (8), (KM) and (12) and is depicted
on gure 3 in the main text. For g  ~g; the equilibrium writes down as e = RHS(; g; ) where
g = () log  and the denition of RHS(:; :) is given above in the appendix. A straightforward
di¤erentiation gives:
d
d
=
@RHS=@
e  @RHS=@ < 0
This expression is negative; indeed from the denition of RHS it is obvious that @RHS=@ < 0; and
we show above that e > @RHS=@:
For g  ~g the joint ownership regime prevails and the equilibrium is characterized by  = 1 and
g = f(0;H): log : Hence it is obvious that  does not impact the equilibrium within this regime.
Finally the threshold value ~g is such that condition (25) is an equality: W (~g) = 
: A straightfor-
ward di¤erentiation gives:
d~g
d
=
 @W=@
@W=@~g
 0
This term is negative because we show above that @W=@g is positive for the value g = ~g and from the
denition of W (:) it is clear that @W=@  0.
B.2 Social pressure
As discussed in the main text the social pressure parameter a¤ects the aggregate equilibrium only in
the in-house regime. Let  be the probability that reputation does not disappear from one period to
the other (ie. 1   is correspondingly the probability that the agent goes back to anonymity). For a
agent; let denote Ut the market present value of bad reputation, Ut the value of anonymity and U coop
the value of cooperating with the entrepreneur. Agents incentive constraint writes down
wt   (1  )et + 1
1 + r

(1  ) Ut+1 + (1  )Ut+1 +  Ut+1

 wt + !t   et + 1
1 + r

(1  )U coopt+1 +  Ut+1

Using the fact that U coopt =
P1
=1
(1 ) (1+g)
(1+r)
fwt + !t   et   wtg ; straightforward computations show
that the incentive constraint writes down in detrented terms as:
![1 + r +    g] + w  e[r +    g] + e+ w + (1  )(u  u) (27)
For an entrepreneur, let denote Vt the market present value of not being on the leading edge, Vt
the value of being on the leading edge with a good reputation (0 is clearly the value of being on the
leading edge with a bad reputation, as in the benchmark model) and V coopt the value of cooperating
with the agent. Entrepreneurs incentive constraint writes down
t   wt + 1
1 + r

(1  )(1  ) Vt+1 + (1  )Vt+1 + (1  ):0 + Vt+1

 t   wt   !t + 1
1 + r

(1  )V coopt+1 + Vt+1

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Using the fact that in detrented value, we have V coop = (r+   g) 1: f   w   !   wg ; V = (r+  
g) 1:v, some computations show that the incentive constraint writes down in detrented terms as:
![1 + r +    g] + w     (1  )v (28)
The agents participation constraint is not changed and is equal to:
w + !  e+ w (29)
As in the benchmark case, the optimal contract for sustaining a given degree of softness is such that
the three constraints (27)-(28)-(29) are binding. Hence workers are always paid at their reservation
wage and consequently we get u   u = 0 in (27). As a consequence  is given by  0e = (   e  
w  (1  )v)=(r+ ()  g): But v =    e  w: Hence:  0e = (   e  w)=(r+ ()  g) and the
KM-curve is now given by:
e = :
S
r + ()  g for g < ~g( (+)
);  = 1 for g  ~g( 
(+)
)
The growth rate ~g corresponding to indi¤erence between in-house production and joint ownership is
still given by condition (25) which writes down as: W (~g) = 
: Di¤erentiating gives d~g=d = 
:W 0(~g)
which is positive as we show previously that W 0(~g)  0: Hence we get that ~g() is an increasing
function.
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Figure A2: Optimal γ under relational contracts:
